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CONFLICT AVOIDANCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAWTHE SPARSELY PEOPLED AREAS AND THE
SINO-INDIAN DISPUTE
DANIEL WILKEs*
INTRODUCrION

Thinly populated territory requires special treatment in international
law. The conflict in Vietnam since 1959 has demonstrated this, as rule
after rule of international law has become inapplicable to the reported
facts. For example, it is deemed legitimate in international law to recognize a revolutionary regime as in de facto control of a substantial part
of a country if it 1) is in effect administering, as a government, a defined part of the territory plus a defined part of the population, 2) can
maintain foreign relations, and 3) is believed to be likely to retain its
control.1
Although large areas of the countryside in South Vietnam are subject
to at least military and tax control of the Viet Cong by night, the specific villages or men and women administered are not necessarily contiguous in space nor continuous in time. Since the same may be said
for daytime administration in many places by the government of the
Republic of Vietnam, traditional recognition rules are of little avail
in deciding, for example, whether Cambodian recognition of the Viet
Cong's National Liberation Front, or United States recognition of
any of the successive governments centered on Saigon, violated international law. Here, the sparsity of population outside the cities was
a key factor in shaping situations in which many of the old rules could
not be applied.
At first sight, then, it may seem that new legal rules are needed to
provide this special treatment. It is the thrust of this article, however,
that what is really needed is a shift in emphasis from reliance on the
*LL.B. Harvard, LL.M. in International Law, New York University, Visiting Associate Professor of International Law, The University of Connecticut School of Law.
1. Cf., RESTATEMENT (SEcoNm) OF FoRtIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE U TE STATES
§ 102 (1965).
2. For Cambodian recognition of the NLF and the establishment of an NLF diplomatic mission in Phnom Penh, see R. SIAPLEN Letter from Cambodia, NEw YoRaER,
Jan. 13, 1968, 66 at 69.
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development of rules to the nurturing of new mechanisms of cooperadon. In this respect the law of sparse terrain is representative of a
much more general shift in international law. Thus, this article uses
the problem of sparsely peopled areas, and in particular of those on
the Sino-Indian border, as a "laboratory" to demonstrate the weaknesses
of past rule-centered law insofar as the avoidance of conflict is concerned.
To do this, a three-stage argument is developed, 1) presenting broad
general principles for change, 2) demonstrating the inadequacy of existing rules, and 3) in conclusion, making some basic proposals.
In the first stage, the background of the shifts in emphasis taking
place in international law is set forth. Here, the major break-through
in the law of territory-the Antarctic Treaty-is used to show a shift
to new techniques. Here, too, the need to resort to new sources for
these cooperative techniques-for example, in the case of border problems, to physical sciences such as hydrology, and to social sciences such
as the economics of development or the politics of regional enterprise
-is emphasized. Finally, the need to keep "peace" and "cooperation"
uppermost as the primary goals for which these techniques are fashioned is presented, exemplified here by changes in the rules of war
which armed conflicts over sparse borderlands require.
In the second stage, the traditional rules for resolving disputes over
sparse territory are explored, one by one. Sino-Indian border areas
serve here as a "laboratory" to demonstrate that agreement on rules
themselves may-and often does-fail to avoid conflict but merely shifts
it to conflicts over facts. In this section, too, some suggestions are made
for handling the problem of minorities living along international
boundaries.
Lasdy, in the third stage, three major proposals are set out. These
in turn are based on the application of the new emphases laid down at
the outset and on the conclusions drawn from the inadequacy of traditional rules.
One caveat is in order. It is clear that in many circumstances two
border states will still be able to agree to have arbitrators apply the
traditional rules to end a dispute between them. It is only because it
is equally clear that in many other cases the absence of new mechanisms
bars cooperation and invites armed conflict that alternatives to the traditional rules are argued for below.
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THE BACKGROUND SET BY CHANGING INTERNATIONAL LAW EMPHASES

When we survey the new tools that international lawyers apply to
the problems of sparsely peopled areas, several themes emerge.
Theme One: We cannot talk about the development of new rules
without talking about the development of new mechanisms for our
nation-to-nation dialogues. In fact, it is precisely because certain rules
are inconsistent with pacific means of discourse that new rules are being devised.
The Antarctic affords us a perfect example. If a right to possess icecovered Antarctic territory were said to stem from "discovery" on the
ground that "greater occupation" is not suitable-by following the
Clipperton Island Arbitration rule 3-then squabbles over priority or
range of discovery could bar new scientific ventures there. On the
other hand, if the right to posses internal ice-covered lands were to stem
from maintenance of a base along the coast-by following the Eastern
Greenland Case rule4-then squabbles would arise over whose base it is
and how far they can claim. This, too, could block the kind of cooperation, for example, that led the United States to turn over its Wilkes
base to Australia for use by scientists of both nations in 1959." The
alternatives were clear: either give up the cooperation and peace, or
develop new rules for Antarctica.
The Antarctic Treaty of December 1, 1959-which placed an express
moratorium on the type of game played by these classical rules-pro-

vided a start in the more affirmative direction.6 The key lessons we
learned from this treaty were: first, that we can devise new mechanisms
which will avoid conflicts, predictable under the old rules, before they
arise. Second, that the new rules for sparsely peopled areas must be
consistent with both, not just one, of our international societal aims:
peace and cooperation.
This last is the most difficult to translate into an operative principle,
rather than mere lip-service. This is especially true where the most
3. 2 Int'l Arb. Awards 1107, 26 AM. J. INL L. 390 (1932).
4. P.C.I.J, Ser. A/B, No. 53 (1933).
5. MODERN ENCYC. OF AUSTRALIA AND NEw ZEALAND 90 (1964).

6. 12 U.S.T.S. 749. Existing alternatives to a war of all against all in the Antarctic
are spelled out in JESSUP AND TAUBENFELD, CONTROLS FOR OUTER SPACE AND ANTARCTIC
ANALOGY (1959). The full panoply of the pre-Treaty national polemics on Antarctic
claims has been superlatively collected in HAYTON, NATIONAL INTERESTS IN ANTARCTICA,
AN ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY (1959).
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dramatic conflicts of the day throw shadows of doubt on the desire
of certain states to cooperate at all.
An honest self-appraisal will reveal conduct by many nations that
could be interpreted by neighbors as inconsistent with desires to cooperate. In this category belong such acts as seizures of fishing boats
where notices to their owners or fines would suffice; closing of consular services as a diplomatic "maneuver"; closing of border roads;
"retaliatory" customs discrimination; and strongly worded protest notes
where informal- exchanges are possible.
An honest appraisal also discloses that world energies directed toward
real cooperation increase with each decade no matter how painfully
precarious present levels may seem to be. Who would have visualized
in 1945, for example, such ventures as the Oceanographic Survey of
the Indian Ocean, the International Geophysical Year, the WHO
Campaign to Eradicate Malaria, or world-wide coordinations by the
Technical Assistance Board?
Finally, the techniques, such as the Indus Waters Treaty, to ensure
that measures to avoid shooting will also increase the chances for joint
efforts, rather than decrease them, are yet being forged. Greater efforts
to develop those techniques, rather than pessimism as to their practicability, has characterised the present stage of transitional international
law.
Theme Two: For this "rethink" of internationalla'w, 'we are drawing increasingly upon materials of other disciplines such as the physical
and social sciences. For example, in the sparsely occupied areas, the
traditionalist's "legal" orientation led him to look for a rule based on
"rights" rather than "use." Yet the proposition "he who first occupies
land holds exclusive right to use it" does not guarantee its use at all.
Suppose we have an island that may be usable by several nations together. If we pose, as the only international law problem, the question
of who has the exclusive right to use it, we have arbitrarily limited
ourselves to use by either state A or state B. To some extent, this
reflects post-feudal coupling of the determination of rights with the
resolution of conflicts which in itself was a significant advance over
the "might makes right" of an earlier day. It may leave us unnecessarily limited in our ability to avoid conflict, as contrasted with resolving it.
Other ways of looking at this island become legally relevant only if
we are willing to shed the blinkers of the purely "rights-conscious"
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approach. For instance, if we consider the technical possibility of its
joint use as a factor of legal relevance, we can bring to bear solutions
that can go beyond mere exclusive rights to use based on "occupation"
or "tide." New solutions have in fact been applied in this identical
situation to permit joint exploitation of Christmas Island phosphates
by Australia and New Zealand. 7 Significantly, this type of "solutionconscious" approach has been proposed to resolve sparsely peopled space
conflicts in Vietnam and elsewhere in the Mekong River region through
solutions revolving around joint development of the river valley as a
whole.
Perhaps, however data from the social sciences will prove the most
helpful of all in forging new tools for conflict avoidance. For example,
use of data-collection techniques to discover the psychological attitudes
of the country-by-country "desk men" in the American State Department revealed that they were basically emphathetic toward their assigned country, while men from other departments tended to be antipathetical in order to represent domestic or security interest.' The dis-

closure of this fact-that, in the decision-making process, opinions which
did not take into account the feelings of the nations with whom we
had friendly relations were numerically weighted against the opinion
of the man best suited to understand those feelings-opened the way to
corrective adjustments.
Theme Three: Changes in internationallaw are limited by purposes
we have already accepted for world public order. These purposes are
often enough stated-to bring, through peaceful cooperation, the intellectual and physical fruits of civilization to all-but they are just as
often subordinated in conflicts over sparsely peopled areas. This occurs
most wastefully when military "life-taking" bars all cooperation from
taking place.
The fundamental question thus posed for transitional law rules is
whether this subordination is in fact required by some other rule of
conduct. For example, the existing rule that each state has a right to
protect its territorial integrity and to call on others to help it to do so
7. Each is an equal partner with the other in mining carried out by a joint Christmas
Island Phosphate Commission. See, 2 WHrTEMAN, DIGESr

OF

INT'L LAw 1103 (1963).

Cf. 1912 proposals for a joint regime in Spitsbergen but with no national ownership at
all, summarized in Jzssup and TAUBENFM, supra note 4.
8. See Pruitt, An Analysis of Responsiveness between Nations, 6 J. OF CoNF. Rzs. 5
(1962).
9. See e.g., U.N. CHARTER, preamble.
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raises just such a question. Suppose "unrestricted military life-taking"
were proposed to fit within the traditional rule of self-defense. Then
the proposed rule of "unrestricted action" could be weighed in terms
of whether it harmonized with or ran counter to the purposive directions we have already accepted for world public order.
As a very minimum, therefore, the protection of territorial integrity
in today's world can remain consistent with these purposes only if:

1. it uses means rationally calculated to reduce the amount of lifetaking activity needed under the rule,
2. it uses means ,which permit the cessation of such activity, and
3. it uses means that are not inconsistent with cooperation after military action ends.
Application of these rules underlay the "peace force" solution produced by Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold for the Suez crisis in
1956. They are also implicit in dialogues between foreign offices about
the case of protection for South Vietnam. Most differences between
them have been expressed in terms of whether given actions, such as
the bombing of training and supply depots in North Vietnam, were in
fact rationally calculated to reduce the ultimate life-taking required, to
permit an end to hostilities, and to permit cooperative development of
the Mekong valley.
The very consequences of such differences over whether steps taken
meet these minimum requirements of transitional international law suggest, also as a minimum, one final general rule:

4. in the protection of territorialintegrity, techniques for conflict
avoidance must assume equal importance with steps toward conflict resolution.
There has been much energy devoted, during our "rethink" of international law, to this question of whether there are such "general principles" to which other rules may be subject. The "whether" question
misses the boat. Statements of "general principles" have become a matter
of concern to international lawyers, not because they are any stranger
to us, 10 but because of fears that others may use valid ones to justify
10. I.CJ. STAT. art 38(d). The necessity of consistency with a Preamble or purposes
had already been applied to whether a convention against night work for women applied only to those in manual work. Interpretation of the 1919 Convention concern-
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actions that are actually inconsistent with the stated principles." The
real challenge facing us is whether we can define the ways in which
these general principles must be applied if they are not to be used to
destroy the stability we gain from predictable rules of world conduct.
The author's own belief is that, especially together with states that
entered the partnership of nations after 1945, our first main task is to
make explicit (a) exactly why certain results reached under traditional
rules are still valid in terms of the recognized common aims of nations,'
and (b) exactly which uses of general principles lead to valid new rules
of world public order and which uses actually run counter to development of world rule of law.
Such an analysis is offered below regarding rules for sparsely peopled
areas. The thrust of this analysis will be to ask the question whether
traditional rules tend to avoid conflict over sparse places. Caveat: The
key mistake to be shunned at all costs is to make any unwarranted conclusion about whether traditional rules may still be relied on in international adjudications when parties decide to resolve conflicts by nonmilitary means. Of course, they can be relied on in such a case. Indeed,
the fact that they must be relied on has a great deal to do with whether
they are adequate to avoid conflicts which become too harmful to fit
in with the needs of our age.
CHARACTERISTICS OF SPARSELY PEOPLED AREAS

There are so few completely unoccupied lands on our planet that
meaningful discussions on old or new titles to territory must start with
the fact we now deal either with densely peopled or with sparsely
peopled ones. In the denser ones, boundary and national sovereignty
13
disputes can and do still persist, whether over title to Upper Silesia
or over Belgian rights to the plots amid Dutch territory involved in

the Case concerning Sovereignty over Certain Frontier Land.4 Howing Employment of Women during the Night, P.C.I.J., ser. A/B, No. 50 (Advisory
opinion 1932).
11. See, e.g., TmsicA and SLSSER, Tm THEORY, LAW, AND POLICY OF Sovmlr TREATiEs
25-26, 40-41 (Stanford 1962).
12. AMERICAN BRANCH OF THE INT'L LAW ASSN., 1963-64 PROCEEDINGS AND CommrrEE
REPORTS 93 (1964).
13. M. LACHS, POISH-GERMAN FRONTIER, 7-9, 17, 73 (Warsaw 1964). The implication

is that Polish tide can be derived both from the international agreements discussed
therein and from the fact of continuous Polish occupation since 1945.
14. [1959] I.C.J. Rep. 209.

1968]

CONFLICT AVOIDANCE IN INTERNATIONAL

LAW

ever, greater density of population leads in itself to greater likelihood
that a dispute will not be resolved by military means.
This discloses the more obvious of the two key differences between
lightly peopled and heavily peopled spaces. The lightly peopled ones,
from a military standpoint, offer a continual invitation to grab them
just from the small commitment of troops ordinarily needed to acquire
de facto control.
The second key difference lies in the greater likelihood that local
resources have not yet been developed in the lightly peopled areas. If
they are to become fully developed, special requirements arise. For
instance, there must be a governing authority that is:
1. committed to its development, and
2. able to "import" into the sparse area the skills, machines and raw
materials needed to develop it. This is true whether these skills and
materials are made available from denser areas within the same state
or from elsewhere.
For instance, Indonesia has projects to bring the Brantas River on
Java under control. Unless controlled, this river's free cargo of lava
and silt will cause thousands of square miles to become wasteland. 15
Yet lack of funds halted projects to train the river itself, and lack of
competent geologist-surveyors prevented an early start for the ambitious multi-purpose dam project on the river at Pohgadjih.'6 In all fairness, the many projects already begun on Java since independence show
the effect which a mere change in the governing body's commitment
to development can have.'
An "obvious" third requirement for development remains:
3. There must be adequate, sustained and trustworthy peace in the
area. It is just this obvious an omission from discussion of "rights" to
territory which leads foreign offices to those steps that may be the most
inconsistent with development goals.
METHODOLOGY

We shall try, experimentally, to apply ,our three themes from above
together with the logic of these requirements for development to the
15.

UNiTED

NATioNs, MuLTIPLE-PuRPosE

RivER BASIN

DEVEOPMENT-PART

ECAFE/Ser. F/14 93 (1959).
16. Cf. PRICE, AMAZING Mississippi, 136-143, 166-167 (1962).

17. UNiTED NATIONS, supra note 15, at fig. 31.

2C, sr
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"legal" problems raised by sparsely peopled areas. After a brief look
at the ways in which polar regions are similar to sparse regions elsewhere, we shall use the situation on the Indian-Chinese border as a
laboratory in which to study the adjustments old rules must make to
fit transitional ones.
ANTARCTIC AND ARCTIC REGIONS AS SPARSELY PEOPLED AREAS

We already have begun to change our international law rules with
regard to the sparse polar regions. It is submitted that these spaces
represent two special types of sparse areas, not just "freak" cases. Thus
they can be looked at as parts of the world in which the ground rules
for sparsely peopled areas are most free to adapt to newly-seen world
needs.
If they are to be set apart at all, it cannot be on the ground that
we cannot occupy them, for the fact is that both areas are now susceptible of "occupation" in the traditional sense. We have only to look
at recent stations in the Antarctic,' or weather posts on the north
polar ice-pack and ice-floes, 9 to see that we are well on the way to
"occupying" them in the sense in which Denmark's "occupation" of
Greenland's glacial and polar ice-covered lands has already been upheld
by the World Court in the Legal Status of Eastern Greenland case.2
Further, both polar regions possess the two characteristics that set
off lightly peopled areas from more densely populated ones:
1. Their sparsity of population creates the same temptations to grab
them by use of relatively small military commitments that other sparsely
peopled areas have.
2. The polar regions have the same lag in development of local
18. BuKYO TSUSHIN KYOiAT, ANTARCTIC 44, 47, 77-85, 94, 97, 100, 109, 117, 130, 141,
145, 157, 169, 181-195, 199-206 (1958).

19. The United States has maintained frozen ocean weather watch crews at Station
Alpha, Station Charlie, Fletcher's Ice Island, Arlis I and Arlis II. 1 ENCYc. INT'L 561
(1964). The Arlis II camp has drifted 5,000 miles and sustained up to 20 men. N.Y.
Times, Jan. 26, 1965, at 8, col. 3. (For photos of this frontier town see, 127 Nat. Geographic 278-281 (1965).) The Soviet Union has maintained at least five ice stations at
once. Hayton, R.D. Polar Problems and International Law, 52 Am. J. INT'L L. 746
(1958); for experiences on early Soviet stations see FYoDoRov, ScIENTIFnc WORK OF OUR
POLAR EXPEDITION (1939) and ARMSTRONG, RUSSIANS IN THE ARCTIC (1958) (courses of

1948 and 1957 stations are mapped at p. 71).
Cf. the nuclear-powered American community complete with laundry rooms and
ping pong tables that exists in Greenland's ice cap, described in WAGER, CAMP CENTURY CITY UNDER THE ICE (1963).
20. STEFANSSON, GREENLAND 160-197 (1942).
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resources. Again it is necessary to stress that this lag is not due to any
inherent impossibility of human exploitation created by the polar cold.
Finnish homesteaders have resisted pressures to move from arctic en21
vironments for several centuries.
In several ways, foreign offices have accepted the key implications
of these characteristics even more rapidly for the polar areas than for
others. First, as the unanimous acceptance of the Antarctic Treaty
showed,22 there already has occurred a shift from efforts to resolve
conflicting claims to efforts to avoid conflicts about them. Second, the
Antarctic Treaty also showed that today's international lawyers look
for techniques which maximize both the chances for resource development and the chances for more joint undertakings.
Indeed, today's fundamental differences over the way we should treat
the frozen north polar seas are due, in part, to opposite views of the
resources involved in the Arctic, rather than to the absence of legal
tools to secure their development. If you stress the navigational interests below and above the ice, techniques to maximize use of the Arctic
by planes and submarine vehicles are in order; if you stress use of the
surface of the ice, i.e., for weather stations, techniques that assign responsibilities on national lines at least become more arguable.
Special polar circumstances, as well as the differences between the
two regions, do warrant their treatment elsewhere. There is no a priori
reason for us to retreat, however, from the principles already accepted
for the sparsely peopled Antarctic when we form transitional rules
for sparsely peopled areas along boundaries. There is also no a priori
reason why techniques for conflict avoidance in the Antarctic may
not contain analogues for avoiding conflict elsewhere. For instance,
there is nothing inherent in the principle of "national sovereignty"
which precludes two states, that agree on the area between them in
dispute, from declaring a thirty-year moratorium on enforcement of
purely national claims, agreeing to local or internationalized administration-as on Christmas Island,23 and permitting its full development.
Indeed, a brief look at the effect traditional legal analyses have in our
Sino-Indian laboratory situation may show why there is room for the
Antarctic principles in shaping techniques for other sparse areas.
21. Address by Prof. D. F. Lynch, in Hanover, New Hampshire, February 23, 1963.
22. Supra note 6.
23. Supra note 7.
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THE INDIAN-CHINESE BORDER DISPUTE AS A "LABORATORY"

FOR

OLD AND NEW RULES

HYPOTHESIS:

Traditional concepts may be inadequate to permit
peaceable development of disputed sparsely peopled areas.

SITUATION: The northern and northeast frontier lands of India
lie in the Himalayas and between the river valleys flowing from them.
They are peopled by nomadic groups, many of whom have made permanent settlements in some of the valleys. 4 For purposes of our "model," military posts of Indian and Chinese troops since the outbreak of
hostilities between them are disregarded. However, prior to these
hostilities, the Indian Defense Department had been building up defenses, particularly through road and airstrip expansion, in the NorthEast Frontier Agency (NEFA) and Ladakh areas.2 5
In 1840, McMahon surveyed a line at the northern edge of the
presently disputed areas which essentially followed the natural Himalayan boundary, bearing in mind certain customary delineations. This
was perceived by him as a line connecting the highest crests and ridges,
following the watershed lines that divided waters flowing into one
boundary state from those flowing into the other, and at times by lines
connecting natural parts of the boundary with each other or with traditional passes between them.26 This line was agreed to, for the sake of
peace, trade and guarantees of protection, by the Tibetan, British and
local Chinese imperial representatives in 1842.27 Parts along the Ladakh
border also coincided with the traditional boundary defined by piles
of stone and recognized in the Tibetan Chronicles.28 Later, trade agree24. As of 1946, in what is today the Northeast Frontier Agency plus Ass-am, all but
28 river valleys had some recorded settlement. National Geographic Society Map of
India and Burma (1946).
25. Brissender, India, Neutralism and SEATO, in MODELSKI, "SEATO" 225-28 (1962).
26. Almost any recent non-Chinese map will show the "McMahon Line" in gross
where it forms the boundary between China (Sinkiang and Tibet) and India. Where a
part of this line is marked "Frontier undefined", it would appear to reflect in most
cases the imprecise language used for connecting sections rather than any major territorial realignment. Compare, for instance, the National Geographic Society Map of
India and Burma (1946) (northeasternmost sector of Northeast boundary marked
"Frontier undefined") with the same Society's Map of China (1945) (sector not marked
as undefined).
27. Krishna, Sino-indian Boundary Question and InternationalLaw, 11 INIr'L & CoMP.
L. Q. 381 (1962).
28. Id.
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ments were made in the presence of Chinese imperial officials, Sun Yat
Sen officials, and, in the case of the 1954 agreement, high Chinese
People's Republic representatives; they all assumed a boundary between
India and Tibet at passes on the McMahon Line.2 9 The last treaty
expressly to confirm this Line was that of 1914, which further provided
for Chinese Sun Yat Sen troops to stay out of one sector whose autonomy would be guaranteed. The Tibetans and the British (for India)
signed it. At the formal closing, however, the Sun Yat Sen official
refused to sign because of the autonomy provisions, not because of the
McMahon Line.30
In the 112 years prior to the first incursions of Chinese border
patrols in 1954, Indian-British administration had been, if not wholly
sporadic, at least something less than wholly continuous. Their administrative and jurisdictional activities included: 1) exploratory and survey parties, 2) punitive expeditions against malefactory tribes, 3) occasional court cases, usually conducted outside the more mountainous
areas, that involved persons from those areas, 4) inclusion of these areas
in linguistic surveys, censuses, maps, legislation, guidebooks or official
publications, 5) "use of areas for trading, hunting, grazing and salt
collection," 6) maintaining of police checkposts and patrols, 7) revenue
settlements, 8) building of roads and airstrips, of NEFA administrative
buildings, and, more recently, of schools and hospitals to serve administered areas, and 9) the sending of reconnaissance patrols to visit border
checkpoints."1
In 1959, the Chinese People's Republic made official claims to areas
previously considered Indian territory and, by 1960, Chou En Lai and
Nehru agreed to have each country present its claims and documents
at a joint meeting. After initial agenda differences-i.e., as to whether
the boundaries of Bhutan and Sikkim were to be discussed, and as to
whether the Indian-Chinese boundary had ever been delimited-each
side presented a description of the bouridary line it claimed to be the
29. Id. at 389.
30. Merani, India-ChinaBorderDispute, 13 J. Pu. L. 163 (1964).
31. Id. at 171-172, 174-176, 177-180; Krishna, Title to Territory, 2 INDIAN J.

INe'L

L.

204 (1962); GRIERSON, LINGUISTIC SURVEY OF INDIA AND THE CENSUS OF 1911 5, 12-15
(1919); LAIIR, ANNExATON OF ASSAM 14-16; SHIPToN, ANTQUE LAND 29 (1950); CHAKRAVORTY, BRmSH RELATIONS ivr THE HELL TRIBES OF ASSAM SINCE 1858 (1964); FURERHAMENDoR, APA TANIs AND THEIR NEiGHBORS 154-161 (1962); Report of the Officials

of the Governments of India and the Peoples Republic of China on the Boundary
Question (Ministry of External Affairs 1961) 298-338, Annex A at 339-340 (hereinafter

cited as Report of the Officials).
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proper one. 32 The Indian and Chinese positions did not appear to agree
as to a single stretch along the over 1700 mile border. In fact, aside
from trisection points with third states, only three points are common
to both descriptions: the Karakoram Pass, the Mana Pass and the Darma
Pass. 33 Before the shooting ended, People's Republic military units
secured de facto control over several areas on the Indian side of the
McMahon Line. 4
ANALYSIS: Claims to sparsely settled areas have been said to rest
on four grounds: 1) location and natural features of the boundary,
2) administrative and jurisdictional acts, 3) traditions and custom, and
4) treaties and agreements. 35 With respect to each of these concepts,
we shall pose the same question: to what degree does it by itself ensure
the amount of peace and cooperation which development on both sides
of the boundary demands?

Location and Natural Features of the Boundary
In a world in which squads of soldiers can be moved by helicopters
and complex building equipment can be carried in by air, traditional
agreement that "natural" geographic bounds are relevant for fixing
political ones ensures neither the narrowing of a boundary quarrel nor
its peaceable resolution.
For example, in the Chinese and Indian confrontation of 1960, both
sides assumed that the way in which geographical features, such as
mountains and watersheds, "divided" their territory was a key to establishing the boundary between them. The Chinese insisted the disputed
Ladakh border was part of the general Sinkiang-Kashmir boundary
direction
along the Karakoram Mountain range following broadly the watershed between the two big river systems, [the Tarim River in
Sinkiang and the Indus River].36
32. Report of the Officials, at 1-4. The Indian description is also substantially set forth
in Merani, supra note 30, at 164-166, and the Chinese description quoted in its entirety
at 166 n.9.
33. Id.
34. The Times (London), Nov. 21, 1962, at 2, col. 1 (cease-fire proposals and map),
Nov. 23 at 12, col. 6 (cease-fire) and Nov. 27 at 9 col. 4 (withdrawal line).
35. See, e.g., Report of the Officials, at 7. "Discovery" has been claimed as an additional ground, but is omitted from our list as serving no useful purpose unless connected
with one of the named four grounds.
36. Id. at 3. Note also Point Three of Chou En Lai's proposed six-point basis for
discussion:
"In determining the boundary between the two countries, certain geograph-
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The Indian government also relied on natural features and even proposed that this be discussed first at the meetingY7 While both sides
thus accepted the relevance of natural features, their dispute did not
appear to have moved one wit nearer to resolution. The arena of contest was merely shifted to "Which watersheds?" and "Which mountain
ridges?"
The Conflicting Watersheds Problem

Rivers that cross boundaries raised this problem most acutely. For
example, to get from one key mountain pass to another in the Himalayas, the Sino-Indian boundary line had to cut across the Qara Qash
River that flows, from its source in Jammu and Kashmir, deep into
Sinkiang. (See Figure 1.) The farther north this boundary can be made
to cross the river, the more of its watershed India (State B) gets, but
the less of this watershed China (State A) must get.
Qara Qash
STAE A

R

Pass
Pass Rz,..
- .--- ,

-''" "

,...

.

_

/

/-/
STATE B

Fig. 1: Schematic diagram of the Qara Qasb trans-borderriver

It is sometimes possible to "gerrymander" the border to keep the entire river basin wholly in the main user's state. (See Line #1, Figure 1.)
Often, however, competing "geographical features-such as the key
passes R and S in the schematic diagram-require the river to be crossed
at some point. The question in dispute then becomes: "Which point?"
Here, existing doctrines provide ways of justifying a given allocation; they do not provide an unequivocal answer. For instance, there
ical principles, such as watersheds, river valleys and mountain passes,
should be equally applicable to all the sectors of the boundary." Id. at 9.
37. Id. at 7. As a concession to the Chinese, treaties were in fact discussed before
natural features.
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is authority for the proposition that the watershed line can be used as
the "natural boundary." 38 State A could seek to tack the watershed
lines along either side of the river to some natural feature, such as a
mountain range, upstream. (Line #2, Figure 1.) On the other hand, the
same theme of keeping to the natural boundaries as much as possible
can be used by State B to push the boundary crossing further downstream if it can find other mountain ridges or vital passes to connect.
(Line #3, Figure 1). Again, uniformity of doctrine is no guarantor
39
against conflict.
TIBET

(Brabmaputra R.)

F
~~Brahmaputra R.

-NI

Fig.2: Schenatic diagram of the Brabmaputratrans-borderriver

A "reverse twist" spin is put on the "legal ball" by Indian and Chinese
claims in the Brahmaputra River basins. (Figure 2.) This river rises in
Tibet; flows eastward; turns south into the North-East Frontier Agency; and bends southwest through Assam. The McMahon Line relied
on by India as both the agreed treaty boundary and the "natural boundary" gave primacy to the crest lines and key passes in the Himalayas.
(Line #1, Figure 2.) To do so, however, it had to cross four IndoTibetan rivers40 at points considerably north of those on the Chinese
espoused line.41 (Line #2, Figure 2.)
38. Island of Timor Arbitration (Portugal v. Netherlands), Hague Court Reports
(Scott) 355, 383 (1916).

39. Cf. the Canadian-United States border at issue in the St. Croix Arbitration (United
States v. Great Britain), 2 Moore's Int'l Adjudications 367 (1929). There the arbitrators tried to take of the desire of the drafters of the Jay Treaty of 1794 to use natural
features to fix the Canadian-American boundary, only to find that the "mountains"
and "watershed" referred to did not exist.
40. The Subansiri, the Tsari, the Dihang [sic] and the Luhit.
41. The Chinese claimed a boundary line which runs due east from the southeast
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This raises a "which-comes-first-the-chicken-or-the-egg?" type of
conundrum. We say the ridge lines are the relevant "natural features"
because they put more of the watersheds of these cross-border rivers
in India. We say the reason for putting these watersheds in India is
that the ridge lines are "the natural boundaries." Vice versa, if the
Chinese urge that these watersheds ought "naturally" to belong to the
upstream state in which they rose, some other "natural feature" further
south would be shot forth into the "natural boundary" battle."
In the particular case of India and China, one way to break out of
this type of tautology is to accept the passes connected by the McMahon Line as the "paramount geographical fixtures." Unfortunately,
if other "paramount geographical features" can be put forward,4 3 the
battle is joined once more. For the general purposes of our inquiry into
the utility of traditional rules in avoiding conflict, it is unnecessary to
approve or disapprove of arguments offered by either side. What is
crucial to our discussion is the fact that two competing "natural features"-the mountain ridges between the passes already in use to travel
from Tibet to India, and the watersheds of tributaries already flowing
from Tibet into a Tibet-born river-can be used under the "natural
feature" rubric to advance opposed positions on where "Nature" has
placed her boundary line.

The "NaturalPlace for a Boundary" Problem
Nor are we any nearer a peaceful resolution if we use the idea of
a "natural location for a boundary" between sparse areas. Admittedly,
if the parties already agree that a given geographic feature is "naturally
located" in such a way as to "naturally form" the boundary, this can
be used to set up the political line. The difficulty is that, in the case of
sparsely peopled areas, this is less likely to be agreed upon today than
in the past.
Several new factors make a dispute about the "naturalness" of a geographical boundary less susceptible to peaceable resolution once vocal
comer of Bhutan and then northeast along the base of the Himalayas. Report of the
Officials, supra note 29, at 4.
42. E.g., the Dibang [sic] River headwaters.
43. Such an argument might equate the hill people of NEFA with the hill people
of Tibet and thus argue that the paramount geographical feature would be the base
of the Himalayan foothills where they meet the plains of the Brahmaputra Valley, as
is in fact the position of the Chinese People's Republic. Report of the Officials, supra
note 29, at 4 and map supplied by China facing page 6; see also an apparently similar
map in LAROUSSE ENCYC. WORLD GEOGRAPHY 523 (1964).
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conflict has begun. These are: a) the ease of modern transport," b) the
rise in ground and airborne military effectiveness, both in numbers and
in range,45 c) the growth in numbers of sparse area colonizers, 6 and
d) the rise in our ability to use and develop sparse areas. 47 Awareness
of these changes can pull us in either direction-toward new conflicts,
or toward new means of conflict avoidance. True, they make a military contest over a sparse area seem both more feasible and more
worthwhile. On the other hand, they produce equally excellent reasons
why full development cannot take place unless the right to be there
free from such a contest is assured.
This is precisely why the traditional "natural boundary" solution
reached in the Island of Timor Arbitration44-where the division between Portuguese and Dutch territory was set at the mountain range
that cut Timor in half-becomes increasingly less relevant. The pattern
that made such a solution easy to arrive at required several conditions,
now practically obsolete, to be present: 1) little knowledge of the resources located there, 2) little awareness of how to exploit many of
them, and 3) a location far from the home countries. This pattern is
far less likely to recur in the disputes of today. In no small measure
due to United Nations assistance, claimants to sparsely peopled areas
have gained an increasing awareness of both the resources they possess
and the ways they can be exploited.4 9 The last condition, too, has been
disappearing as sparse areas come under the claim of former colonies
in the vicinity, and the possibility of protracted conflict rises.

The Rule of the Temple Preab Vihear Case
The proof that transitional international law has already recognized
44. E.g., trucks now travel over the road, built by the Chinese across India's disputed
Aksai Chin territory, connecting Sinkiang and western Tibet. See map, 13 Keesing's
Contemporary Archives 19124 (1962). Cf. the social and economic changes which
similar transport developments by India have led to in NEFA Himalayan frontier districts, described in FORER-HAIMENDORF, supra note 31, at 154-157.
45. Compare Lord Curzon's criticism of his military officers for using 200 men,
needed elsewhere, for an expedition against the Mishmi tribes north of the Brahmaputra, cited in CHAKRAVORTY, supranote 31, at 140.
46. E.g., compare the disclosure in May of 1965 that 12,000 to 20,000 Indonesians had
settled on sparsely populated Mindanao in the Philippines. N.Y. Times, May 24, 1965,
at 11, col. 5.
47. In the Himalayas men have tented without oxygen as high as 19,500 feet above
sea level, see HILLARY, HIGH ADVENTURE 128 (1955).
48. Supra note 38.

49. For examples of such surveys in southeast Asia, see UNImT

NATIONS,

supra note
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the need for this shift from "natural feature" rules to less arguable ones
lies in the Temple Preah Vihear decision by the World Court.50 There,
a line surveyed to mark out boundaries already agreed upon in a 1904
treaty was supposed to follow the "natural" boundary between Thailand-then Siam-and Cambodia-then French. At the point under dispute, the geographical feature was the "watershed line."
The real item under dispute, however, was a Buddhist temple located
near the edge of a cliff. To place this temple on Thai soil, Thailand
urged the World Court to find that the cliff edge was the "natural"
line dividing the waters of the two states. Cambodia, on the other hand,
asked the Court to accept an early mapped line later relied upon in negotiations or either of two extra surveys' watershed lines, any of which
would put the temple on Cambodian soil. Thus the Court had before
it no less than four possible boundaries to choose from. Faced with
this relative instability of such "natural" boundaries, the Court held
(9-3) that a) the treaty itself evidenced the aim of the parties to achieve
final stability as to their boundary, b) this stability could best be
achieved by binding both countries to the original mapped lines relied
upon by the parties or their predecessors in later negotiations, and c)
thus, it was unnecessary [sic] for the Court to consider where the
natural feature, the "watershed line," was actually located:"
The rule that emerges from the Temple Preah Vihear decision is
not the narrow one that natural boundaries in treaties must yield to
later maps and other conduct of the parties; rather, it is that
today's crucial need is for adjacent states to get along with each
other if both are to develop the resources on their own side of the
boundary; thus this need requires us to place a higher priority upon
boundary stability than upon the originalnatural boundaries them52
selves. [Emphasis added]
The futility of references, repeated by both sides in the Indian-Chinese
border dispute, to the "natural features" on which, inter alia, they rely,
only further emphasizes the need for this shift to some greater stability
if conflict is to be avoided.
50. Temple of Preah Vihear Case (Cambodia v. Thailand),

[1962] I.C.J. Rep. 6

(Merits).
51. Id. at 33.
52. See Wilkes, D. New Emphases and Techniques for International Law-The Case
of the Boundary Dispute, 15 WEsMrEN RESERVE L. REv. 632-635 (1964) and the sources
cited therein.
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Administrative and JurisdictionalActs
Traditionally, continuous administrative acts have been used as evidence to show that a state has "occupied" territory. It is just one step
removed, however, to substitute "administration" itself and emerge with
a new rubric. Factual continuous administration may be easy to determine in densely populated regions, such as the municipal parcels involved in the Case concerning sovereignty over Certain Frontier
Lands.5 3 However, continuous acts are far less likely to have occurred
in sparse regions. The question we must face squarely, therefore, is:
can we afford to have title to sparse regions stand or fall on whether
there exists a continuous string of administrative acts-by only one of
the disputing states?
In the Indian-Chinese border confrontation, the Indians offered 82
documents to establish this "continuous" administration of the NorthEast Frontier Agency territory now claimed by China. These included
items such as diplomatic notes in which the government of India acted
as the administrator, and a 1935 document to show these very areas
were excluded from normal regulations of the central Indian government. 4 Some of these documents are partially self-serving in the sense
that they presume the right to administer this Himalayan hill country
and yet are offered to establish the fact that India administered it. Other
evidence, such as the 1935 order, can cut both ways; it asserts that the
area is subject to regulation by the claimant state, but at the same time
admits that it is not susceptible to administration in the ordinary sense.
A third kind of evidence shows factual governing activities in the hill
country, as in India's 1914-15 report on taxation and other administration in the Abor and Mishmi tribal areas. These last can establish some
administration; they can even establish repeated administration. What
it is hardest for them to do is to establish continuous administration.
A few examples serve to underscore this point:
Example #1-Surveys. As evidence of administration of each of
the disputed areas, India submitted proof of several surveys carried out
for the British or Indian governments. The trouble with this is that the
Chinese People's Republic also claims to have surveyed "India's" Aksai
Chin area in 1954 and 1955. Their subsequent construction of a road
53. Supra note 14.
54. Report of the Officials, at 335; the complete roster of documents offered by
India is contained on pages 298-338.
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through that area buttresses this claim.5 Again, this is not stated to
evaluate the Chinese claim, but rather to show that, for sparsely peopled
areas, a 'battle of the surveys' becomes especially possible.
Yet another problem is created by the incomplete survey or census.
For instance, a party making a magnetic survey of British Sikkim in 1855
reported it was stopped from continuing because of the hostile Nepalese
there. 6 Does this establish an administrative occupation by the government of India or one by Nepal?
Again, a linguistic survey of India in 1919 was able to use 1911 comparative census figures for all of India except Ladakh, for which they
had to use census figures from 1901.Y1 Does this establish that Ladakh
was subject to continued administration by India from 1901 to 1919
by linking the two types of surveys, or does it raise the question of
whether India had enough administrative control in Ladakh in 1911
for a thorough census there? The same 1919 survey also noted that
its figures for languages spoken by the North Assam tribesmen were
small because
except in the case of Miri, nearly all the speakers of these languages live outside settled British territory. Hence the small numbers recorded. 58
Does this linguistic survey establish the presence or the absence of
Indian administration over the Aka, Abor, Dafla and Mishmi tribesmen
and the Himalayan areas in which they live?
Example #2-Exercise of criminal jurisdiction. As two of the 146
evidences of administration for the disputed middle sector, India submitted records of two criminal cases, one in 1927 and another in 193039
55. id. at 257; see also, map cited in supra note 44. It has been argued that Chou
En Lai's disclaimer in 1954 of any knowledge of the building of this road eliminates
any possibility of a "prescriptive" right arising, for India did not learn of the road
until 1958. Krishna Rao, supranote 31, at 206.
56. SCHLAGINTWEIT, H. REPORT ON THE PROGRESS OF THE MAGNETIC SURVEY OF INDIA
I- SiKKim, KHosA HIus AND ASSAM 6 (1856).
57. GmIEsoN, supra note 31, at 11.
58. Id. at 15. Of all the non-Miri speaking tribesmen, the survey covered only 20
Akas, 170 Abors, 990 Daflas and 220 Mishmi in this area north of the Brahmaputra
Valley. Except for the Abors, these groups all live on the Indian side of the snow

range backbone of the Himalayas.

CEAKRAVORTY,

59. Report of the Officials, at 327.

supra note 31, at 3.
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Does this establish the presence of Indian criminal administration in
1927 and 1936 or the absence of it between 1928 and 1935?
It is not unusual for high mountainous regions to be freer from law
enforcement than other parts of a country. i.e., in the United States,
the illegal production of "moonshine"-alcoholic whiskey usually made
from corn or maize-still persists in the Appalachian mountains.6" However, a special side effect occurs where the sparse hilly grounds are not
surrounded by administered areas, as in the sectors disputed between
China and India. Here, if the title to the hills were left to turn on the
presence or absence of continuous exercises of criminal jurisdiction,
probably neither side would end up with "title" for several reasons.
First, you may have as many or more periods when crimes go unpunished as those when they are punished, as was the case with the
Mishmi tribesmen of northern Assam between 1861 and 1899.61
Second, you may have punishment on the disputed sparse area by
troops or police of both sides, as when Chinese troops were sent in to
clear the areas well on the Ladakh side of the Karakoram Pass of
bandits in 1946.62
Third, the presence of armed tribesmen with the advantages of
mountainous and sparsely populated terrain can militate in favor of a
policy of deliberate non-administration of the area.63 Such a policy
may be motivated by a frank realization that the government that claims
control over their territory cannot in fact control them.' On the other
hand, the price of submission to "control" may be that the "controllers"
agree to leave traditional tribal administration alone. 5 In both cases,
the fact that such a policy existed for the area shows an assertion of a
right to jurisdiction that is in a sense at least partially self-serving. In
both cases, it also shows that, if title is to turn on whether criminal or
other jurisdiction was in fact exercised continuously, many methods of
60. Compare the presence of slavery in Apa Tani villages in northern Assam in 1945,
observed by the anthropologist, FORER-HAIMENDORF, supra note 31, at 79, 81, 88-89.
61. CHAKAVORTY, supra note 31, at 136-40.
62. Reported first hand by SmProN, supra note 31, at 29.
63. This was the case in the Assam hills after 1884. CHAKAVORTY, sutpra note 31, at
170-71. For persistence of this policy by exclusion from regular administrative laws
and orders, see, e.g., the 1935 document cited in note 54, supra.
64. E.g., it was Mackenzie's report in 1884 as to tribes "over whom we can exercise no control" that led to the Assam hills 'non-administration' policy. CHAxlI voR-Y,
supra note 31, at 166 n.4.
65. Compare the insistence of Sarawak's Dayak tribesmen that Rajah Charles Vyner
Brooke's cession of Sarawak to the British government would continue their traditional
tribal self-rule. See hlAcDONALD, BORNEO PEOPLE 26 (1958).
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dealing with sparse areas and their peoples would become inconsistent
with any state's "tide" claim.
In the Chinese-Indian dispute, India did not rest her claim on any
single type of administrative and jurisdictional acts, but on the totality
of them, as well as on other factors. Nevertheless, the two basic defects
just illustrated remain. Some acts will still be ambiguous in establishing
"continuous administration," and even acts that are not ambiguous can
be used to fan the fires of conflict in the very regions where it is vital
to see that conflict is avoided.

Traditions and Custom
This is the real "powder keg" of traditional boundary law. Even in
densely populated areas, we have had all too many calls to restore "traditional boundaries" by rejoining "Sudetenlands" with common roots
or customs. One would have thought we had separated long ago the
arguable question of protecting minority groups from this no-longerarguable one of whether states can go to war to "regain" lands which
are theirs solely by virtue of "tradition." Only by keeping these two
questions quite distinct can we keep boundary rules and public order
aims consistent.

Sparse Areas and Combat by Document
Where a border separates sparsely peopled areas, however, the "doctrine" is still very much alive, but by no means any the less dangerous.
First, the "fact" of traditonal occupation of the territory itself becomes
more open to "proof" by either side. One side's "tax collector" becomes the other side's "bandit." 66 Second, the sparseness of the area
invites even greater likelihood that the "legal" contest will be settled
by a modern "trial by combat."
This is the case with respect to the Aksai Chin area on the Indian
side of the traditionally mapped border with Sinkiang and western
Tibet. India produced 57 documents to prove "customary" occupation;
China produced still fewer items.6 7 Yet both had heaped on the fire
enough coals for a prolonged dispute, so long as the agreed ground rule
was that a title claim could be made out on "traditional" ownership.
66. E.g., between 1943 and 1945, British military patrols were sent to turn back

Tibetan tax collectors or "bandits" in the Dihang [sic] Valley.
BoR Ra 166 (1964).

67. Report of the Officials, at 255-266, 298.
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India pointed out that Chinese records were sparse; 68 China claimed
in a letter to foreign diplomatic offices that she had proved
'with a large volume of conclusive data that the traditional boundary line as pointed out by China had a historical and factual basis.69
India rejected monastic records of Chinese-Tibetan customary control
as irrelevant; China rejected Indian material based on travels of foreigners as "obviously valueless." -oIndia pointed out her subjects had
used these hills for pastures; China rejoined she had sent an army there
unhindered, surveyed it, and built a long motor highway across it without even discovery by India until 1958. 71
It would be naive to imagine that the major military campaigns
launched by China in the three disputed areas could have been averted
here if this "Combat by Document" had been avoided. It is equally
naive to suppose that cooperation is best attained by traditional doctrines and procedures that make such "Combat" possible.

Combat by "Local Custom"
A brief look at any ethnic maps of Africa or Asia will show that
many a healthy border would become an open sore if title to sparse
areas could turn on the origins of local peoples or other proofs of their
connection with the claimant across the border. Yet title grounded in
"customary" control-which, by definition, must be something other
than actual administrative control-raises just such a spector. Precisely
because this is a rubric for something short of actual control, it can,
often in the name of "self-determination," crop up as a recurrent excuse for redetermination, unless some less litigious ground can be found.
For example, the Chinese have introduced evidence that Tibetan
Buddhist authorities traditionally considered the monasteries in Ladakh
to be under their control. Since many settled lands in Ladakh are traditionally rented from these monasteries, the "customary control" dispute really boils down to a question of who has held those monasteries'
loyalty during the periods in dispute.72 The difficulty is that in sparse
68. Id. at 257.

69. Letter of Nov. 15, 1962 of Chou En-lai, reprinted in SINO-INDIAN BOUNDARY
QuE ToN 20-21 (1962).

70. Report of the Officials, at 256; letter of Chou En-lai, supra note 69, at 21.
71. Report of the Officials, at 298, 257, SINO-INDIAN BouN-ARY QuEsTiON, supra note
69, map no. 1 following p. 37; accord, Krishna Rao, supra note 31, at 206.

72. See DouGL.s,

BEYOND ThE HIGH HiMALAYAs

190-193 (1953), who traces the Mos-
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areas each side may be able to "prove" some kind of loyalty. Take
the kind of proof that turns on payment of taxes, for example. If people in Zondereygen pay taxes to Belgium, this becomes a sign of their
loyalty and of administrative advantages they receive from "their"
government in return.7 3 Once we turn to sparsely peopled border areas,
however, we often find intermittent payments to several sides. Furthermore, this may be done, not to obtain administrative advantages, but
to guarantee freedom from any administration at all. With such loose
"ties" involved, can title to Ladakh be made to turn on whether this
chain of customary command ran "farmer to lama to Lhasa" or "farmer
to lama to rajah to Raj?" If so, title claims become far from secure.
For instance, China might claim those duars of eastern Assam who once
paid tribute to the Durbar of Bhutan, who paid tribute to Lhasa, who
74
paid tribute to the Chinese government.
Another kind of proof turns on "inferred loyalty." This is proof of
traditional allegiance by proof of common roots or customs. For example, the Chinese premier builds his "Chinese" Ladakh from the fact
that Ladakhis use Tibetan lamaist geographic names, such as chu for
"river" or la for "mountain pass." 75 The facts of Himalayan life reveal,
however, that if language is to prove anything at all, it would prove
these peoples "belong" to no-one, for
as a rule, each tribe is separated from its neighbours, and languages
thus quicldy split up into dialects which easily develop into a distinct language. . . These [mountain dialects] are mutually Un76
intelligible.
The nub of this type of argument is the idea that "like should take
lem eviction of the Chinese from Ladakh in the 16th century, its annexation for India
by the Maharajah of Kashmir in 1646-47, its'reconquest' for India by the Rajah of
Jammu in 1834 when some 25% of the Ladakhi monks fled to Tibet. The four methods
for rental from the lamas in the 1950's are described in DoucLAs, supra at 191-192.
73. Case concerning sovereignty over Certain Frontier Lands, supra note 14.
74. Political dispatch of Col. Robertson, March 27, 1839, reported in Lahiri, supra
note 31, at 220-21. Compare present Chinese attempts to reestablish Lhasa's earlier
loose overlordship over the Himalayan states, reported by Robertson through creation
of a Nepal-Bhutan-Sikkim federation by rebel troops. Observer (London), Feb. 7,
1965, at 13, col. 8.
75. Letter of Chou En-lai, supra note 69, at 8; as to Chinese evidence of Tibetan
calendars, language and festivals in occupied NEFA towns, see Joint Report of Journalists, Peking Review, Jan. 25, 1963, p. 13.
76. GlrasoN, supra note 31, at 5; (emphasis added).
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care of like." The rubric under which it is put is that "common customs evidence a custom of common rule." Admittedly, treaties and
arbitrators determining boundaries have tried to avoid dividing local
tribes, as in the tribal enclaves created by the 1859 Treaty between
Netherlands and Portugal on their Timor border.77 This may be done
in agreed cases. If the same logic were to be available in disputed areas,
however, it would be as easy, for instance, for India to show that valleys of Tibet where Abori dialects are spoken are proof these sections
of Tibet "belong" to the Abori hills of the North-East Frontier Agency
78
as it would be to prove the opposite.
The "common customs" gimmick almost guarantees a non-cooperative squabble where multiple groups are involved. Here, arguments
based on one group's contacts across the border can be met by ones
based on another group's contact the other way. Even President Wilson, in fixing a border between Greece and Turkey, confessed his inability to harmonize the desires of four such groups to remain together. 9
Thus, the solution to the problem of trans-border groups just cannot
lie in permitting claims to "rejoin" what are inferred to have once been
joined. The solution can lie in two ways in which more stable borders
can be attained.
First, 'world efforts for protection of minority groups vnrst be increased. This can be done by:
(a) Codes for protection of minority frontier groups, such as the
one put forth by the Delhi World Rule of Law conference;
(b) development of the good offices of the High Commissioner for
Refugees;
(c) more regional courts for civil rights protection, such as the European Human Rights tribunal;
(d) use of more detailed equal protection clauses in treaties to spell
out safeguards for minority groups descended from those of
foreign origin; and
(e) more United Nations technical assistance projects intentionally
aiding groups along potentially explosive boundaries.
77. See I HACKWORTH,

DIGEST OF INTI'L LAW

78. Cf.,

supra note 31 at 5.

79.

CHAKRAVORTY,

HACKWORTH,

supra note 77 at 715.

714-15 (1940).
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Second, the differences a boundary 7makes in daily life can be deliberately reduced by:
(a) simplifying regulations for crossing the boundary, such as visafree travel;
(b) regional simplifying of boundary functions, such as the Nordic
Council's absence of passport requirements for Scandinavians
in Norway, Sweden and Denmark; and
(c) achieving greater freedom of movement by economic and other
associations, such as has been achieved by the O.E.C.D. or the
I.A.T.A. °
Protection of minority groups along a border is by no means a minor
problem, but we cannot afford to have it persist as a recurrent "boundary" problem.
The Battle of the Maps
One map speaks volumes; yet maps can have many meanings. A map
based on a survey evidences administration of the area surveyed. A map
annexed to a treaty evidences agreement. An official map published by
one government can evidence its acquiescence in the border line used
for the border with its neighbor. A map shown by one side's diplomats
in negotiations, and not objected to by the other side, also evidences
81
agreement or acquiescence.
Unofficial maps to establish "traditional" borders in sparse places,
however, do not speak with the same unequivocal tongue. Here, the
very sparseness breeds unfamiliarity, and the unfamiliarity breeds conflict. In the dispute at hand, for instance, India produced some 44 Indian maps plus 9 Chinese ones, 2 while China produced just enough to
"ante up" for the contest. India produced Chinese atlases to "establish"
the traditional NEFA area border. Thus, title to the other disputed
sectors becomes less stable if some Chinese atlases show them as Chinese.
Atlas maps, travel guide maps and other maps are all two-way streets.
If 100% of them showed the identical line, the "traditional boundary"
doctrine would bring peace and collaboration. Unfortunately, examples
80. Boas,

INTrERNATIONAL BOUNDARIES 201 (1940).

81. Preah Vihear Case, supra note 50, see generally, Weissberg, Maps as Evidence
in InternationalBoundary Disputes: A Reappraisal,57 Am. J. INTL L. 791 (1963).

82. These maps are listed in Report of the Officials, at 339-40.
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of such unofficial maps that differ sharply are not hard to find.8 3 Thus,
such a battle often ends, not with a bang, but with a babble.
If all three arenas-"natural features," "administration" and "tradition"-are used at once, the permutations possible become a college
debater's delight. The basic issue remains: can we afford to have thousands of square miles of sparsely peopled border lands "put up" for
debate? It does not matter how an impartial judge would rule.84 If
we are to move the necessary rung up on the world order ladder, we
must aim at avoiding any such "debate" at all. Certainly, India deserves
better security for her sparsely peopled frontier areas than the knowledge she can win a World Court case if only China would submit to
85
one.

Thus the one conclusion we can readily draw from these first three
arenas is that there must be some surer ground on which to rest tide
claims for sparse areas. Do treaties provide that ground?
Treaties and Agreements
Most borders rest quite firmly on the treaties on which they have
been built. Along these borders, peaceful transit is a fact of daily life,
and security to build without threat of attack "runs with the land."
The 3,000-mile unarmed Canadian-American border is such a place.
Yet it took no less than 26 treaties, protocols, arbitral disputes and
hearings of commissioners from 1782 to 1925 to mark it.8 6 Thus, there
83. E.g., for an entirely different Ladakh border, see Baron Augel, Map of the Punjab, Kashmir, Iskardu and Ladakh comprising the Dominions of Ranjeet Singh compiled from the Original Documents (n.p. 1849) in the British Museum map room; for
lines closer to base of the Himalayas in NEFA areas, see Goode, J. P. Eurasia (Harrup
Physical Wall Map Series, London 1914), Ramsey, Stanford's Orographical Map of
Asia (1878), Wheeler, J. T. Short History of India (1884), map at 472, LARoussE
ENcYc. WoRLu GEOGRAPHY (1964) at 523, and Mineral Resources of Eurasia based on
Soviet Karta Metorozbdenii Poelznykh Iskopaemykh Mira Minsk, 1955 (1959).
84. India offered to refer the dispute to the I.C.J. if Chinese troops returned to their
Sept. 8, 1962 positions. Speech of Nehru, Dec. 10, 1962 reported in 13 KEEsrNG's CONTEMPORARY AxcmvEs 19142 (1962). Although we will probably never learn what the
exact solution of the Court might have been, some of the finest examples of international law argument in the boundary area have been presented by India's Legal Officer,
K. Krishna Rao in Sino-Indian Boundary Question and InternationalLaw, supra note 27.
85. On Dec. 20, 1964, Chou En-lai told the National People's Congress that the
United States had been informed in ambassadorial talks in Warsaw that China would
refuse to enter the United Nations until the representative of Formosa had been excluded. 13 KEING'S CONTEMPORARY ARCHIvEs 20776 (1965). A fortiori, submission
to the I.C.J. while a Taiwan Chinese judge is on the Court is most improbable.
86. See BoGGs, supra note 80, at 219-24.
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is no magical "permanence" to a treaty border thought by its drafters
to have been fully marked. A boundary treaty brings agreement; but
it may also bring disputes, changes by force, rancor and disaffirmances
as well.
The Indian-Chinese border dispute presents the gamut of treaty
problems that may remain. This border was the subject of some 107
treaties.8 7 The earliest raised the first type of problem, that of the
Indefinite Boundary Description. To cite but one example, early
treaties spoke of the "traditional boundaries of Ladakh" to describe part
of the Indian border with Tibet."'
A second type of problem that arose was that of the Ambiguous
Reference. Typically, this is a reference to a natural feature that is not
what it is described to be. For instance, one treaty refers to a part of
the Kashmir-Sinkiang border as along "a crest line that is the watershed." '9 When the crest and watershed lines turned out to be different,
which one marked the border?
A third type of problem which is possible is that of the Treaty with
the Wrong Party. For instance, to "annex" Kuriapara and Charduar
in the Assam hills, the East India Company paid the Durbar of Bhutan
"compensation for loss of revenue." But the hillmen in these sectors in
fact paid no tribute to the Durbar, but were under the indirect rule
of Lhasa at the time. 0
Yet a fourth type is the Broken Treaty problem. Does the frustration
of some part of the boundary treaty nullify the boundary concessions
given as the quid pro quo for it? An interesting development in the
Chinese-Indian dispute is the Chinese insistence that "India sent troops
north of the McMahon Line" and that, even if the Line were valid
before, it became invalid because of this.91
Traditionally, we have relied on the tools of "arbitration," "litigation" and "negotiation" to handle these problems of the boundary
87. Report of the Officials, at 288-97.
88. For one difficulty here, compare a map of India today with Baron Angel's map
in note 83 supra.
89. Lord Curzon described this section of the Himalayas as "200 miles of tumbled
masses of peaks and gorges" without any "clear crested ridge," and noted that its water
divide was often not identical with its highest crest. LoRD CURZON, FRONTIERS 19 (1907).
Cf. a similar dilemma arose after the Chile-Argentina Treaty of 1881 had erroneously
referred to the Andes' "highest summits which form the watershed." Broek, J.O.M.
Problez of NaturalFrontiersin FRoNTERs OF THE FuTURE 12-13 (1941).
90. LAmaR, supra note 31, at 222-23.

91. Letter of Chou En-lai, supra note 69.
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treaty. Unless new techniques emerge, however, the result is predictable
in each case: cooperation stops while the flames of debate are fanned.
CONCLUSIONS

CONCLUSION #1: There is a great need for new mechanics of
dialogue about boundaries in sparsely peopled areas. As we have seen,
traditional concepts from arbitration and tribunal cases can support
either side in the type of dialogue in which India and China, for example, exchanged over 378 diplomatic Notes on their border dispute. 2
No disputes are more deep-seated than border ones. Yet in no case is
a dispute between two states as backward in terms of modem emphases
on multi-state cooperation as one over a border. Consequently, the
main goal of new rules for sparsely peopled areas is to avoid the conflicts predictable under the old rules before they arise, not merely to
aim at resolving them.
PROPOSAL: For many boundaries, there is a close enough rapprochement between the states along them so that the boundary can
be fixed for all time. 3 Probably most boundaries fit into this category.
Yet if some further step is not taken to make these lines permanent,
bad times may follow the good and even traditionally recognized zones
can become a source of unwonted rancor. The framework for a solution is already at hand in the United Nations' International Map of
the World on the Millionth Scale (IMW) being prepared by the Economic and Social Council. In the past few years new or revised maps
for parts or all of 78 international borders have been deposited with
the IMW.9 4 Unfortunately, all areas on the map are covered by the
following legend:
Boundaries shown on this map are not, in some instances, finally
determined and their reproduction does not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.9 5
A cartographic conference recommended that when one state is to submit a map for areas which include part of another, an agreement should
92. 13 KEESING'S CONTEIMPORARY ARCHVES 19121A (1962).
93. See e.g., the clause definitive in German treaties with France (1951, 1956), Belgium (1956) and the Netherlands (1957) cited in LACHS, note 13 supra, at 37.
94. See Int'l Map of the World on the Millionth Scale-Report of 1962, ST/ECA/
Ser./D8 (1963) at 13-14 and Reports for 1960, 1961 and 1963.
95. Id. at 13-14.
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be worked out for a single map with information supplied by both
countries. Yet despite the amount of agreement obtainable, so long
as their map becomes subject to the general legend, a major opportunity is lost.
As a first step in avoiding future conflicts, therefore, those making
the IMW should be authorized to record those lines which the border
states themselves agree should be their boundaries for all time, subject
only to change by agreement or some other authorized means. Thus
a system much like our Torrens Land Title Registration in the United
States could be created for most of the world's borders.
The initiating General Assembly resolution would set forth:
(a) the clear intent to have boundary maps deposited under this
resolution binding upon the parties unless changed by the means specified,
(b) the authority for the IMW to record some maps in this way,
while continuing to record other maps as subject to the legend, and
(c) the mechanics of getting authorized changes in fixed boundaries.
At the same time, the Assembly should consider the long-range advisability of authorizing deposit of like maps in a 1:25,000 scale or any
intermediate scale similarly agreed upon by the border states.
CONCLUSION #2: Some boundary disputes have been resolved
without force, sometimes by arbitral or judicial decision, sometimes by
negotiation. We have seen that there are difficulties with even these
peaceful channels, not the least of which is the forestalling of joint
ventures during the process of resolving the conflict. Yet another difficulty stems from the recurrent fact that agreement in gross, itself,
does not always result in agreement in detail. If the mechanism that
establishes the boundary after a potential dispute is recognized is to
allow joint development to continue, new tools are required.
PROPOSAL: Elsewhere, it has been suggested that boundary surveys could be carried out under internationalized auspices. 6 The advantages of a World Boundary Commission are compelling. First, it
can develop a reputation for impartiality and accuracy upon which
others can rely, e.g., to reduce agreed boundaries to 1:25,000 scale
maps. Second, it can pool those with surveying skills and equipment,
This will make available persons with training or tools when they are
96. See WILKEs, supra note 52, at 639.
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not to be found on the borders to be marked; it will also lead to additional uniform standards in surveying and map recording. This is not
a new proposal. Uniform standards have been a goal of such organizations as the International Hydrographic Bureau, the International Federation of Surveyors, and the Pan-American Institute of Geography
and History; 7 they were recommended by Trygvie Lie in 1949 when
he first suggested a United Nations Cartographic Office; 98 they are
currently under consideration by conferences meeting on the IMW."
Most important of all, it could create for the first time a body whose
main concern is the avoiding of boundary conflicts. This alone could
(a) lead to a greater awareness of the need to seize on periods of rapprochernent to avoid future conflicts, (b) provide access to a new kind
of forum outside the traditional arenas for national posturing, and (c)
serve as a source of fresh proposals for use of sparse areas near boundaries, for surveying and marking of borders, for dealing with changes
in border riverbeds, water levels or earth contours, and for new boundary rules.
In concrete terms, it is proposed that this Boundary Commission be
established by General Assembly resolution with three branches. A
technical branch would handle actual surveying; on request, it would
supervise, train or advise local and technical assistance survey missions.
To some extent, this would build on the existing coordinations by the
United Nations Cartographic Office whose work could be raised to
the stature that the proposed commitment to a World Boundary Commission involves. An executive branch would have responsibility for
deposit procedures for the International Maps of the World and for
proposals in the border area. Finally, a panel of Commissioners would
be available for boundary mediation.
If this role is not to suffer from the posturings characteristic of existing channels, it must:
1. aim at non-public dialogues,
2. create and hold to those psychological milieus that increase

chances for joint ventures by states with troubled borders, and
97. Report of the Secretary General on Coordination of Cartographic Services of
Specialized Agencies and International Organizations, ECOSOC, E/1322 (1949)

at 88,

and Add. 1 at 199.
98. Id. at 53.
99. See Int'l Map of the World to the Millionth Scale, Proceedings of the 1962 Conference, vol. 2 (proposed uniform markings) (1965).
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3. help to bring aid for trans-border projects into the picture as
much as possible.
In this role, a World Boundary Commission may be better situated to
accomplish what President Johnson has tried to do with American
offers of one billion dollars for Mekong Valley development. WBC
proposals would come from an impartial, rather than a partisan source.
Its project proposals would be multilateral, and could take advantage
of the UN Technical Assistance Board's coordination. It would be
committed to look for solutions that averted conflict, and that strove
in conflict situations to keep the doors of cooperation, if not open, at
least ajar.
CONCLUSION #3: Sparse areas provide the open invitation to grab
them which dense areas lack. Yet, because of their sparseness, conflict
on them often lacks the dramatic events that arouse world concern.
We are in danger, therefore, of facing a series of "creeping expansions"
near these less populated borders of Africa, Asia and Latin America,
unless some step is taken to close that invitation. 100
PROPOSAL: If the problem of boundary disputes is seen as a serious
enough one, the following increases in mechanisms available to avoid
them are possible:
1. If it is possible for two states to demarcate their border for all
time, they should be encouraged to do so. The proposal for a FixedBorder deposit for the International Map of the World to the Millionth
Scale adds to existing treaty demarcation a further means of doing this.
2. If a part of the border is in dispute but is susceptible of arbitration or mediation, some body should be charged with the responsibility
for broaching to the parties the possibility of a more cooperative milieu
if the matter is settled once and for all. The proposal for a World
Boundary Commission adds an alternative forum which explicitly avoids
public posturing while such a settlement is being worked out.
3. If a part of a border is in dispute but it does not appear "negotiable," the advantages to both sides of a long-term moratorium of all
border claims should be considered. Where the right to use the disputed
area is in dispute, unless some joint development scheme is possible, a
100. Boggs counted 180 international borders some 102,000 miles long in all, as of
1940. Of these, 106 were in Africa, Asia or South America. BOGGS, supra note 80, at 212.
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moratorium on claims is not what either party wants. However, there
may be cases where the very thing a claimant desires is some mechanism
by which he can preserve his claim without having to fight for it.
Traditional rules require states to keep pressing their claims or give
them up; yet border claims are the most difficult to keep pressing
without keeping the border states apart.
De facto moratoria occur all the time. They are the cease-fires without treaties after armed conflict. Yet when armed force is first threatened, some method of avoiding the conflict other than complete backing down may be desired. The crucial thing is to realize that an agreement to keep back the bullets does not represent a victory, if the animus
over the border remains. Thus, a key part of any moratorium device is
a specific, realizable and phased Plan for Development across the border
to go with it.
In short, there must be a "carrot" involved, rather than a "sop." This
"carrot" must be both able to be seen and able to be believed in. Unfortunately, solid long-range planning that requires a several-year dam
construction is neither as visible nor as credible as something that can
be done right away.
The more that shooting is likely, moreover, the more difficult will be
the diplomat's job of making this "carrot" preferable to the emotional
releases of prolonged border conflict. This is not to say we do not
need the dam; this is to say the incentives for border ventures must
include both short-range as well as long-range projects. And where
armed conflict seems inevitable there may have to be escalations of
cooperation. The Johnson Proposal to use one billion dollars for the
Mekong Valley, instead of the 77 millon dollars sought for the existing
1964-1968 development plan, is just such an attempt.' 0 ' If political goals
and "jelled" hostilities in Viet Nam are not already a bar to cooperation
there, much more must be done to make this proposal a visible and
credible thing after rancor and bloodshed has stepped in. The time for
border boldness is before the conflict begins.

101. Cf., ECAFE, "Summary Records of the 20th Session", E/CN.11/667 255-56
(1964).

